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SECTION 4507 AND THE
IMPORTANCE OF PRIVATE
CONTRACTS
Thomas W. Greesont
Heather L. Gunast
ONE OF THE MORE CONTROVERSIAL sections of
the Balanced Budget Act of 19971 ostensibly enables physicians
and Medicare patients to enter into private contracts for the pro-
vision of health services beyond the scope of the Medicare pro-
gram.2 Unfortunately, the draconian terms of Section 4507 suc-
ceed to prevent, rather than promote, private contracts between
physicians and their patients. For the first time in the Medicare
program, the law effectively prohibits private contracts except
as dictated by Section 4507. While Section 4507 gives the ap-
pearance of enhancing a patient's ability to choose health care
providers and services, 3 it actually succeeds in limiting patient
choice as never before.
This Article discusses some of the inherent flaws created
by Section 4507. A fundamental tenet underlying this discus-
sion is that Medicare patients and providers should be able to
enter into private arrangements with their physicians for serv-
ices on a case-by-case basis without governmental interference.
t Thomas W. Greeson is of counsel with the law firm of Reed Smith Hazel &
Thomas LLP in Falls Church, Virginia.
t Heather L. Gunas is an associate with the law firm of Reed Smith Hazel &
Thomas LLP in Falls Church, Virginia.
Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4507, 111 Stat. 439, 439-42 (1997) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395a(b) (Supp. 11I 1998)).
2 The Medicare program was established in 1965 and is now the largest public
payer of health care services and supplies. Recent numbers show that Medicare cov-
ers about 38 million persons 65 years of age and older, and about five million dis-
abled persons under 65 years of age. The Medicare program consists of two parts: A
and B. Part A benefits extend to hospital, skilled nursing facility, home health, and
hospice care. Physician and outpatient services are covered by Part B, which is af-
fected by Section 4507. See Karen Visocan, Recent Changes in Medicare Managed
Care: A Step Backwards for Consumers?, 6 ELDER L.J. 31, 32 (1998) (citations
omitted).
3 Section 4507 is codified under 42 U.S.C. § 1395a which, ironically, is enti-
tled: 'Free choice by patient guaranteed."
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Section 4507 weakens this basic principle. The reader will ulti-
mately conclude that the law is inappropriate for the health
needs of the Medicare population and should be modified sig-
nificantly or repealed.
I. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE LAW
A. Medicare Options Generally
Medicare is currently the only insurance option for those
sixty-five years of age or older, as no other insurance plan of-
fers such coverage. 4 Thus, in a classic Hobson's choice, a pa-
tient over sixty-five may go uninsured or "voluntarily" join the
federal program.5 In order to receive reimbursement for services
under the Medicare program, a physician6 or practitioner7
(hereinafter referred to jointly as "physician") has two options:
accept assignment of a patient's benefits and receive Medicare
rates, or bill a patient directly for up to fifteen percent above the
Medicare rate. Acceptance of assignment results in direct pay-
ment to the physician from Medicare's contracted Part B car-
rier. Under the second option, a patient would receive reim-
bursement directly from Medicare, and the patient would have
the fiscal responsibility to pay the physician directly for her
services. Also, a patient has always and may still privately con-
tract for services that are excluded from Medicare, such as cos-
metic surgery or hearing aids.
4 Since the enactment of Medicare, private health insurance companies no
longer provide primary coverage for those 65 years of age or older. See Complaint
For Declaration of Rights and Injunctive Relief at 10-11, Stewart v. Sullivan, 816 F.
Supp. 281 (D.N.J. 1992) (No. 92-417) (requesting that plaintiffs maintain their en-
rollment in Medicare, yet have the ability to pay for certain services privately without
losing enrollment status).
The Hobson's choice element of Medicare only enhances the restrictive nature
of Section 4507.
6 For purposes of Section 4507, "physician" means a "doctor of medicine or a
doctor of osteopathy who is currently licensed as that type of doctor in each State in
which he or she furnishes services to patients." 42 C.F.R. § 405.400 (1999).
7 For purposes of Section 4507, "practitioner" means a "physician assistant,
nurse practitioner, clinical nurse specialist, certified registered nurse anesthetist, certi-
fied nurse midwife, clinical psychologist, or clinical social worker, who is currently
legally authorized to practice in that capacity by each State in which he or she fur-
nishes services to patients or clients." Id.
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1. Advanced Beneficiary Notices
For non-covered services, a physician may provide a pa-
tient with an Advanced Beneficiary Notice (ABN) warning a
patient that potential services may not be paid by Medicare, and
that the patient may be responsible for the entire cost of serv-
ices. However, ABNs are far from a panacea to Section 4507. In
general, Medicare's determination for reimbursement of serv-
ices depends on the standard of "reasonable and necessary," 8 a
standard with little guidance that often eludes even the most
perceptive physicians. The Health Care Financing Administra-
tion (HCFA) has never published a final rule describing how it
determines whether a health care service is or is not "neces-
sary," thereby leaving a physician unable to predict if services
will be reimbursed. 9 Often times it is unclear whether a service
will be covered by the program until after a claim has been
filed. As discussed below, this uncertainty surrounding reim-
bursement creates a tangible risk for physicians utilizing
ABNs. l0
Misuse of ABNs can expose physicians to fraud and abuse
sanctions; HCFA is likely to undertake severe sanctions against
a physician for providing unnecessary services." Even when
8 The Social Security Act prohibits payment for Medicare Services "which are
not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury or to
improve the functioning of a malformed body member." 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A)
(1994).
9 According to a 1989 proposed rule, the criteria considered by HCFA when
determining the reasonableness and necessity are whether the health care service is (i)
safe and effective; (ii) not experimental or investigational; (iii) cost effective; and (iv)
appropriate. See Medicare Program; Criteria and Procedures for Making Medical
Services Coverage Decisions That Relate to Health Care Technology, 54 Fed. Reg.
4302, 4307-09 (1989). HCFA has never defined any of the terms used in these fac-
tors. In fact, HCFA states that "[not all of the criteria are necessarily pertinent to
every coverage issue and each criterion is not necessarily given equal consideration
in reaching a final decision. Because of the complexity and variety of issues involved
in making coverage decisions, [HCFA does] not think it is possible, or advisable, to
try to get quantitative standards or develop a formula in the application of these crite-
ria." Id. at 4307.
10 When a physician provides services to a Medicare beneficiary that may not be
covered and cause the physician to provide an ABN to the patient, the physician nev-
ertheless bills the patient and the Medicare program for the services. If denied by
Medicare as non-covered, the physician may seek payment from the beneficiary,
having provided the ABN warning to the patient prior to providing the services.
11 See Private Contracting in Medicare: Hearing Before the Senate Finance
Committee, 105th Cong. (1998) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Kent Masterson
Brown, Counsel, United Seniors Association) available in 1998 WL 8992722.
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physicians make use of ABNs, they may remain vulnerable to
violating Federal law:
Any person... that... knowingly presents or causes to
be presented to an officer, employee or agent of the
United States, or of any department . . . thereof, or of
any State agency.., a claim.., that the [HCFA] de-
termines... is for a pattern of medical or other items or
services that a person knows or should know are not
medically necessary ... shall be subject, in addition to
any other penalties that may be prescribed by law, to a
civil money penalty of not more than $10,000 for each
item or service .... In addition, such a person shall be
subject to an assessment of not more than 3 times the
amount claimed for each such item or service in lieu of
damages sustained by the United States or a State
agency because of such claim . . . . In addition the
[HCFA] Secretary may make a determination in the
same proceeding to exclude the person from participa-
tion in the Federal health care programs... and to di-
rect the appropriate State agency to exclude the person
from participation in any State health care program. 12
In a statement before the Senate Finance Committee re-
garding private contracting, attorney Kent Masterson Brown
stated that:
All that is needed for HCFA to begin the sanction proc-
ess against a physician is a "pattern" of what it claims
are "unnecessary" services .... Because ABNs cannot
be used routinely without being subject to sanctions,
physicians will severely limit and not provide health
care services which they believe HCFA may find to be
"unnecessary. ' ' 13
Because federal law discourages a physician's utilization of
ABNs, this notice should in no way be presented as a viable al-
ternative to private contracting on a case-by-case basis.
12 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7a(a) (West Supp. 1999).
13 Hearing, supra note 11.
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2. Contrast Media - An Example of the Inadequacies of ABNs
ABNs are not appropriate for every health care service,
and, unfortunately, are "not allowed with regard to certain pro-
cedures."14 A perfect example of an ABN's limitation is found
in the use of non-ionic contrast media for imaging procedures.
There are presently two options for imaging studies -- non-ionic
contrast media (also known as low osmolar contrast media or
LOCM) or ionic intravenous contrast media. Hundreds of stud-
ies in animals and humans have shown that LOCM causes less
"discomfort and nausea and fewer other minor generalized re-
actions,"' 5 and helps prevent complications, particularly for pa-
tients with congestive heart failure, severe aortic stenosis, car-
diogenic shock, and left main coronary artery disease.16 How-
ever, LOCM is more expensive than ionic material, 17 and will
be reimbursed by Medicare only under very narrow criteria.18
14 Group Argues Legislation Improperly Bars Seniors From "Wanted Medical
Treatment," MEALEY'S MANAGED CARE LuB. REP., July 22, 1998, at 14, 14 (pre-
senting the opinion of the Citizens Against Government Waste).
'5 John W. Hirshfeld, Jr., Low-Osmolality Contrast Agents -- Who Needs
Them?, 326 NEw ENG. . MED. 482, 482 (1992) (discussing the costs and benefits of
conventional and low-osmolar contrast media agents in imaging procedures).
16 A large independent study evaluating non-ionic and ionic contrast agents in
approximately 400,000 patients has confirmed that if one uses severe reactions as an
indication of safety, non-ionics are approximately six times safer. See Hitoshi Kata-
yama et al., Adverse Reactions to Ionic and Nonionic Contrast Media: A Report from
the Japanese Committee on the Safety of Contrast Media, 175 RADIOLoGY 621
(1990).
17 See Douglas P. Utter, Survey of Contrast Media Use in Southeastern U.S.
Hospitals, 68 RADIOLoGY TECH. 386, 386 (1997) (investigating current contrast us-
age in hospital radiology departments in the Southeast, and identifying current trends
related to contrast media).
IS If the beneficiary does not meet any of the following criteria, the payment for
contrast media is considered to be bundled into the technical component of the pro-
cedure, and the beneficiary may not be billed for LOCM:
(1) A history of previous adverse reaction to contrast material, with the exception
of a sensation of heat, flushing, or a single episode of nausea or vomiting;
(2) A history of asthma or allergy;
(3) Significant cardiac dysfunction, including recent or imminent cardiac decom-
pensation, severe arrhythmia, unstable angina pectoris, recent myocardial in-
farction, and pulmonary hypertension;
(4) Generalized severe debilitation; or
(5) Sickle cell disease.
1 CCH, INC., Medicare and Medicaid Guide, 3453 at 1254-55 (1999) (citing Spe-
cial Rules for Payment of Low Osmolar Contrast Media, 56 Fed. Reg. 59, 627
(1991)).
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Besides these barriers, the use of LOCM is further compli-
cated by state requirements for informed consent that encourage
patient choice. A number of state courts have adopted the modi-
fied informed consent disclosure of risks and alternatives of
medical procedures known as the "prudent patient" standard. In
these states, the standard is not based on a "prudent physician,"
or what a reasonable physician would have done in the situation
(e.g., choose to disclose the risk of a procedure), but rather on
whether the physician disclosed those risks which a reasonable
man would have considered material to his decision whether or
not to undergo the procedure.' 9 Although radiological studies
requiring injection of contrast media carry relatively minimal
risk overall, there is a statistical probability that one in 100,000
patients can die from an adverse reaction to the contrast.W in
states following the "prudent patient" standard, physicians gen-
erally seek consent prior to performing exams requiring contrast
media.
According to recent statistics, the cost differential between
non-ionic and ionic media has dropped significantly.21 Never-
theless, HCFA's payment policy has remained unchanged.
Thus, even though LOCM is ideal for some patients, and some
patients, having been informed of the potential risk of death
from the procedure, may request the arguably safer but more
expensive non-ionic contrast material, they are prohibited by
Section 4507 from paying. out-of-pocket for the procedure if
they do not fit Medicare's restrictive categorization. That is,
physicians cannot request an ABN for a procedure that is a cov-
ered service, albeit at an inadequate payment level for those
outside the criteria but desirous of using LOCM. Patient choice
is hampered because this is a payment policy, not a coverage
issue.
'" See Hoffman v. Mogil, 665 A.2d 478, 483 (Pa. Super. 1995) (quoting Festa v.
Greenberg, 511 A.2d 1371, 1375 (Pa. Super. 1986)).
20 See Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 408 N.W.2d 355, 357 (Iowa
1987) (holding that a physician was not liable for the death of a patient by failing to
inform the patient of a one in 100,000 procedural risk).
21 The cost differential has dropped from 15-20:1 to 5-7:1. See Paul M. Silver-
man, Re: Ionic Versus Nonionic Contrast Media, 168 AM. J. RoEN13ENoLooY 1620,
1620-21 (1997).
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B. Section 4507
Erroneously construed as a new option, private contracting
under Section 4507 allows a physician to opt-out of Medicare
and bypass the program's rules entirely. In such cases, all pay-
ments for services become a patient's responsibility. To effec-
tively opt-out, a physician, whether participating in the Medi-
care program or not, must submit an affidavit stating that he or
she will not submit any claim under Medicare for any item or
service provided to a patient during a two-year period beginning
on the date the affidavit is signed.22 Thus, even if a physician
desires to contract privately with just a single patient, a physi-
cian's decision to opt-out would affect his or her entire patient
base . 3 In addition to this affidavit, a physician must enter into a
separate agreement with each of his or her patients that includes
certain language requested by law.24 These requirements make
Section 4507 an unattractive choice for physicians.
H. SECTION 4507 DOES NOT SANCTION A
PREVIOUSLY FORBIDDEN PRACTICE
Prior to Section 4507, the Medicare program did not bar
private contracting, and any suggestion to the contrary is incor-
rect. The Medicare regulations clearly state that one of the con-
ditions for Medicare payment is that a "provider, supplier, or
beneficiary, as appropriate, must file a claim that includes or
makes reference to a request for payment."5 Thus, if no claim
was filed for Medicare reimbursement, a patient and a physician
could determine their own arrangement. The lack of a bar
against private contracting was affirmed in Stewart v. Sulli-
van,26 a 1992 case decided by the New Jersey U.S. District
22 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395a(b)(3)(B) (Supp. M 1998).
23 One of the requirements of the opt-out affidavit is an acknowledgment by a
physician that "the terms of the affidavit apply to all Medicare-covered items and
services furnished to Medicare beneficiaries by the physician or practitioner during
the opt-out period... without regard to any payment arrangements the physician or
practitioner may make." 42 C.F.R. § 405.420(h) (1999).
24 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395a(b)(2) (Supp. 111 1998) (requiring that, among other
things, the contract include agreements by the beneficiary that he will not submit
claims to Medicare, and that he will be responsible for payment for services ren-
dered).
2 42 C.F.R. 424.5(a)(5) (1999).
2 816 F. Supp. 281 (D.N.J. 1992) (examining the issue of private contracts be-
tween physicians and Medicare patients with respect to the alleged policy of the De-
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Court. The plaintiffs in Stewart were Lois J. Copeland, M.D., a
New Jersey physician, and five patients who desired to contract
privately with Dr. Copeland.27
The plaintiffs attempted to affirm their rights and the rights
of other Medicare patients to contract and pay for medical
services privately on a case-by-case basis without having to dis-
associate themselves completely from Medicare Part B.28 The
Court stated that "[n]either the [Medicare] statutes nor the
regulations expressly address the issue of whether disenrollment
on a partial or service-by-service basis is acceptable under the
Medicare program. 29 Most importantly, Judge Nicholas Politan
found that he could not "possibly conclude that the Secretary
[of the Department of Health and Human Services] has clearly
articulated a policy on the issue of private contracting." 30 Be-
cause the Medicare program did not expressly forbid private
contracts, basic principles of statutory construction dictate that
patients could enter into private contracts with their physicians.
This, of course, changed with the enactment of Section 4507.
II. PRIVATE CONTRACTING IS NOT A REALITY
DUE TO THE LAW
"[O]ver . .. [ninety-six percent] of... [U.S.] physicians
provide services to Medicare beneficiaries.'' The vast majority
of physicians are unable to meet the obviously stringent pa-
rameters of Section 4507. It is unlikely that all of a physician's
Medicare patients would want to contract privately, and few
physicians could withstand a two-year opt-out from the pro-
gram. Not surprisingly, as of October 1, 1998, a scant 647 of the
more than 600,000 physicians who annually bill Medicare had
opted-out,32 and the restrictive nature of the law makes it un-
likely that this number will increase significantly. Also, the law
appears to limit private contracting for Medicare services to the
partment of Health and Human Services of examining these contracts on a case-by-
case basis).
27 See id.
2 See id.
29 Id. at 283.
30 Id. at 289.
31 Hearing, supra note 11.
32 See Kay K. Hanley, Private Contracting by Medicare Patients, REP. oF Tim
A.M.A. CouNcIL ON MED. SERa., 6-A-99, at 2 (1999) (describing the private contract-
ing provision of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and physician reaction to opt-out
opportunities) (on file with Health Matrix).
[Vol. 10:35
SECTION 4507 AND PRIVATE CONTRACTS
auspices of Section 4507, thus creating for the first time the in-
ference that any other private contracts are barred and ineffec-
tive.
Unfortunately, in light of its importance, Section 4507 has
several flaws, and its very existence stands in the way of the
constitutionally protected right of patients to contract privately
for medical services. Since the "all or none" approach makes it
unlikely that many physicians will take advantage of Section
4507, the law has the unintended consequence of prohibiting
private contracting altogether. Ultimately, then, the law serves
to prohibit, rather than promote private contracts between pa-
tients and physicians.
IV. INHERENT FLAWS CREATED BY SECTION
4507
A. Section 4507 Has A Paternalistic and Suspicious Nature
The strict confines of the law are based on the assumption
that patients and physicians are unable to decide independently
the level and type of care necessary for the well-being of a pa-
tient. This assumption is clearly erroneous. Today's patients are
able to access more health information than ever before, and can
become extremely educated consumers. "[A]n abundance of
new - and expensive - pharmaceuticals [are] being directly mar-
keted to consumers on TV, radio and in print ... and pa-
tients are able to learn about a wide variety of treatments. Ad-
ditionally, Medicare patients had relationships with other physi-
cians prior to their "voluntary" enrollment in the program. Be-
fore age sixty-five, patients were able to determine who would
provide their services and the level and type of these services.
Even if an insurance payer to some extent restricted a patient's
access to services, they were always free to pay-out-of-pocket
for any uncovered services. As it stands now, the government
3 Vida Forbister, Risky Business: Patient Demand for Specific Drugs Has
Squeezed Medical Groups with Financial Responsibility for Managing Plans' Drug
Costs, AM. MED. NEws, July 5, 1999, at 16, 16. In fact, pharmaceuticals may be re-
imbursed by Medicare in the near future. Currently, patients are able to educate
themselves about pharmaceuticals and often have wide latitude in choosing a par-
ticular drug treatment. It is probable that patient choice in this area could be seriously
infringed under Medicare if they are unable to contract privately on a case-by-case
basis.
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assumes that patients are unable to continue making such key
decisions into the latter part of their lives.
The practical prohibition of the law on private contracting
on a case-by-case basis appears to stem also from a suspicion
that physicians want to contract privately in order to receive
more compensation for services, or even gouge patients by
charging considerably higher-than-Medicare rates. Price goug-
ing is not an inevitable result of private contracting. 34 This is
particularly true considering that private contracting would al-
low the market to control costs. As with any other good or
service, patients would be able to "shop" for the best price for
certain services. It is likely that market forces would prevent a
great deal of potential patient gouging. Moreover, it is outra-
geous for Congress to imply that most physicians are not guided
by ethical concerns and the best interests of their patients. Most
importantly, the many benefits of private contracting on a case-
by-case basis override even a moderate risk of excessive costs.
It is in the best interest of a patient to be able to contract
privately on a case-by-case basis. As discussed previously, there
are certain services that fall outside even an ABN.35 To illus-
trate this point, in a report to the American Medical Associa-
tion's House of Delegates, the AMA's Council on Medical
Service discussed some of the advantages to private contracting:
Those just entering the Medicare program might want to
continue treatment with their long-standing physician,
who may not participate in the program. Others faced
with a life-threatening condition may want to seek care
from a recognized expert who is not accepting any new
Medicare patients. In addition, a patient may reside in
an area where the physician does not normally take
Medicare patients. Private contracting enables these re-
lationships to be effected.36
And, according to the American Psychiatric Association, "pri-
vate contracting is the only means of guaranteeing Medicare
3 According to one commentator, "[m]ost physicians will not take advantage of
their patients. To base the policy [of Section 4507] on fear that many will do so is
offensive; to impose the policy on all doctors even though only a few will do so is
wrong." JOHN S. HoFF, MEDICARE PRIVATE CONTRACTING: PATERNALISM OR
AUTONOMY 45 (1998).
35 See discussion, supra Part I.A.2.
36 Hanley, supra note 32, at 4.
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beneficiaries of confidentiality when seeking psychiatric treat-
ment if they desire., 37 The paternalistic and suspicious nature of
Section 4507 prevents private contracting on a case-by-case ba-
sis despite a number of legitimate reasons to grant patients the
maximum ability to choose physicians and services.
B. Law Grants Medicare Managed Care Participants Most
Choice
As noted above, Section 4507 pertains to Medicare Part B,
or the fee-for-service portion of the program. However, some
patients participate in a Medicare managed care program for
Part B services.38 These managed care programs seek to control
access to services and physicians; compared with the fee-for-
service patients, participants have fewer physician options and
possibly other restrictions. Because of these restrictions, if a
Medicare managed care patient seeks services from a non-
network physician, he or she is responsible for paying the non-
network physician. This is in line with the policy that any serv-
ice not covered by Medicare is considered outside of the pro-
gram and is, therefore, payable entirely by the patient.3 9 A man-
aged care patient is able to pay privately for any type or level of
service, as long as the service is outside the network. Ironically,
with the enactment of Section 4507, Medicare managed care
participants now have much more latitude and choice than
Medicare fee-for-service patients! This is an absurd result con-
sidering that the premise of managed care is centered around
providing greater management and regulatory controls than the
fee-for-service environment. This difference in patient choice is
particularly pronounced in those areas where over thirty percent
of the Medicare population is in managed care plans.
40
37 Testimony of the American Psychiatric Association on Medicare Private
Contracts, Presented to the Senate Committee on Finance, Feb. 26, 1998 (on file
with Health Matrix).
38 About fifteen percent of Medicare patients receive care through managed care
or capitated plans. See HoFF, supra note 34, at 53.
39 To recap, such extra-Medicare services may be obtained through private con-
tracting. See discussion, supra Part I.A.
40 See Visocan, supra note 2, at 33 (citation omitted).
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C. Restriction on Emergency and Urgent Care Has Potential
Harmful Effects
A private contract entered into by a patient and a physician
shall "[n]ot be entered into by the beneficiary or by the benefi-
ciary's legal representative during a time when the beneficialr
requires emergency care services or urgent care services."I
However, the regulations state that a physician's decision to
opt-out will not be affected if a physician "furnishes emergency
care services or urgent care services to a Medicare beneficiary
with whom the physician or practitioner has not previously en-
tered into a private contract, provided the physician or practi-
tioner complies with [certain] billing requirements ...[under
Section 405.440(b)]." 42 Along the same vein, a physician may
not submit claims for emergency or urgent care for those pa-
tients with whom the physician has a private contract. Because
emergency and urgent care can be extremely expensive and be-
yond the budget of most patients, the result of this restriction is
to impose a financial barrier to discourage the opted-out physi-
cian from treating his or her patients with emergency or urgent
care.
The restriction has the serious potential of jeopardizing a
patient's health. Presumably, a patient and a physician would
enter into a private contract because the patient seeks services
from that particular physician. It is not an improbable scenario
that the patient and the physician could find themselves faced
with an emergency or urgent situation. The physician is obvi-
ously in the best position to address this kind of situation.43 As
the patient's physician, he or she is probably the most knowl-
edgeable about the patient's condition and, therefore, would be
best equipped to render treatment. Also, the physician may be
exposed to considerable liability by delegating the patient's care
to others in such scenarios.
In a program memorandum regarding the implementation
of Section 4507, HCFA requires Medicare Part B carriers to
"[d]eny payment for emergency or urgent care items and serv-
ices to both an 'opt out' physician or practitioner and the bene-
41 42 C.F.R. § 405.415(k) (1999).
42 42 C.F.R. § 405.440(a) (1999).
43 An example might be an emergency situation that occurs during a patient's
visit to the physician's office.
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ficiary if these parties have entered into a private contract." 44
Moreover, HCFA admits that the distinction between emer-
gency/urgent care and non-emergency/urgent care is not easily
discernable and is based on the carrier's judgement: "[t]his is
not going to be an easy line to draw and is probably going to
require individual judgmental medical decision making by [the
carrier] . .. "45 Certainly this distinction will be difficult for
physicians as well. At the least, Section 4507 should be modi-
fied to allow all emergency and urgent care to be reimbursed
even if such care is rendered to a Medicare patient by a physi-
cian who has opted out.
V. RATIONALE FOR PRIVATE CONTRACTING
ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS WITH NO
GOVERNMENTAL INTERFERENCE
A. Private Contracting on a Case-By-Case Basis Increases
Physician Choice
Medicare rates for services are lower than rates in the pri-
vate market for similar services. 46 These lower rates prompt or
even require physicians to limit the number of Medicare pa-
tients in their practice. In fact, a 1994 survey of 1,000 physi-
cians indicated that only seventy-three percent were accepting
any new Medicare patients.47 Many Medicare patients would be
willing to buy a level of service that is not reimbursable by
Medicare, and many are able to pay more than Medicare rates.
As discussed below, the Medicare population will increase dra-
matically in the near future. Because many physicians already
limit their number of Medicare patients, patient choice will be-
come increasingly restricted. Case-by-case private contracting
allows patients to be cared for by physicians who already have a
maximum number of Medicare patients. Also, private contract-
ing facilitates "the ability of physicians to serve more Medicare
4 CCH, INc., Private Contracts Between Beneficiaries and Physicians,
MEDIcARE AND MEDICAiD GUIDE 150,028 [1998-2 Transfer Binder] at 400,081.
4' Id. at 400,081-82.
46"Medicare [currently] pays only 71% of... rates paid by the commercial
[insurance] market." HOFF, supra note 34, at 35 (citing PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW
COMnssIoN, 1996 ANNUAL REPORTTO CONGRESS 216 (1996)).
47 See id. (citing National Opinion Research Center, Survey of Physicians About
the Medicare Program and Fee Schedule, May 11, 1994, at 43).
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beneficiaries by using the higher private contracting rates to
offset the lower Medicare paid amounts."
48
B. Upcoming Demand on Medicare Program Makes Selective
Private Contracting Fiscally Sound
We are facing a major increase in the Medicare audience.
Today, one in eight Americans is over the age of sixty-five;49 by
2050 the number will have increased to about one in five, with
the fastest period of growth occurring between the years 2010
and 2030. 5 - The "oldest old," or those eighty-five or older, will
have the greatest growth during this time even though they
comprise only ten percent of the current population -- it is an-
ticipated that by 2050 they will represent up to twenty-five per-
cent of the population.51 Technology, as well as demographics,
may aid Medicare's growth. As technology improves, it is likely
that more services will be covered by the program. Conse-
quently, Medicare can only expect to see increases in the num-
ber of participants and utilization rates.
With this upcoming burden, it is imperative that policy
makers develop cost-saving measures. It is only logical and
cost-effective to permit Medicare participants who have the fi-
nancial resources to pay their physicians privately. Such a pol-
icy would help preserve the program for other patients who
must or want to continue their Medicare fee-for-service cover-
age. There has been much debate and discussion recently to
means test Medicare coverage according to a patient's ability to
pay. Private contracting helps to means test Medicare coverage
informally without having the government mandate such re-
strictions.
C. Government Has Presented No Constitutional or Legal
Justification For Intervening In The Patient-Physician
Relationship
It seems reasonable that a Medicare patient should be able
to spend his or her own money to purchase medical care pri-
" Alexandra E. Trinkoff, Private Contracting with Medicare Patients, 5 N.Y.
HEALTH L. UPDATE 3 (1998).
49 See INsTITuTE oF MEDIcINE, BEST AT HOME: ASSURIr QuALrrY LONG-TERm
CARE IN HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED SETTINGS 22 (Jill C. Feasley ed., 1996) (pro-
vidin that this growth stems from the aging of the baby boom generation).
See id.
5' See id.
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vately from a specific physician. The AMA's Council on Medi-
cal Service notes that:
Supporters of private contracting ... argue that Con-
gress has not articulated any Constitutional or legal jus-
tification for intervening in the patient-physician rela-
tionship .... Under Article I, Section 10 of the [U.S.]
Constitution, no state can pass any law impairing the
obligation of contracts. It is unclear how Congress, un-
der the authority granted to it by Article I, Section 8,
could control or limit the right of two persons to engage
in such a contract. If a person is not taking taxpayers'
money and goes outside of Medicare to seek or give in-
dependent medical treatment, that behavior is logically
exclusive of Medicare and not fit for congressional or
governmental supervision. That supervision, funding,
and control should cease at the boundaries of Medicare
itself.52
The fundamental right of personal autonomy has long been
recognized by the Supreme Court and this right should extend
to a person's ability to make decisions concerning his or her
medical care. The Supreme Court found a fundamental liberty
interest in the right of individuals to make decisions regarding
contraception, 53 and in decisions regarding the refusal of un-
wanted medical treatments to sustain life.54 It follows that
Medicare beneficiaries should have the right to exercise their
personal autonomy to purchase desired medical services at their
own expense, and that this right is fundamental. As an example,
under the analysis of contrast media, a Medicare beneficiary
who fails to meet the Medicare reimbursement criteria for low
osmolar contrast media is deprived of the right to choose and
pay out-of-pocket expenses for such media in order to minimize
the potential for an adverse reaction during a radiological pro-
52 Hanley, supra note 32, at 4-5.
53 See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a
Connecticut statute forbidding contraceptive use violated the right of marital privacy,
which is within the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights).
m See generally Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)
(holding that a state can require evidence of an incompetent patient's wishes regard-
ing the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment to meet a clear-and-convincing stan-
dard).
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cedure.55 This denial of choice deprives the patient of a funda-
mental liberty interest. Furthermore, using the same example,
depriving an individual who happens to be a Medicare benefici-
ary of the right to purchase the more expensive non-ionic con-
trast media deprives that individual of the fundamental right to
equal protection. Since the right to personal autonomy should
be treated as a fundamental right, the government should be re-
quired to show a compelling interest in order to justify such dis-
crimination against Medicare beneficiaries. 56
VI. CONCLUSION
Rather than preserve the right for Medicare beneficiaries to
contract privately, Section 4507 of the Balanced Budget Act
establishes a barrier that had not previously existed. As dis-
cussed above, the problems surrounding Section 4507 are obvi-
ous. Ideally, Section 4507 should be repealed entirely in order
to maximize patient choice and reinforce the ability of patients
to make decisions concerning their medical care. However,
amending the law could prove helpful. New legislation could
repeal the two-year opt-out period and empower a Medicare pa-
tient and her physician to enter into a private contract on a case-
by-case basis for any period of time. This simple amendment
would correct many of the concerns discussed in this Article. In
fact, these amendments were in the "Medicare Beneficiary
Freedom to Contract Act" which was introduced in the 105th
Congress.5 7 Ultimately, the benefits of private contracting on a
case-by-case basis for any length of time clearly outweigh any
risks to the integrity of the Medicare program.
55 Studies have shown that low-osmolality agents reduce the risk of major ad-
verse reactions during radiographic examinations. See Hirshfeld, supra note 15, at
482.
56 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-84.
57 See H.R. 2497, 105th Cong. (1997) (attempting to "amend Title XVIII of the
Social Security Act to clarify the right of Medicare beneficiaries to enter into private
contracts with physicians ... for the provision of health services for which no pay-
ment is sought under the Medicare program").
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